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Border Institutions - What Is Lacking in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands Dispute 
 
Dexin Tian, SCAD-Savannah, USA 
   Chin-Chung Chao, University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA 
 
Abstract: This study explores the interactions among the claimants for the sovereignty over the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands dispute with the intention to find out what is lacking in their communication for a genuinely peaceful 
and mutually beneficial solution to the multilateral international conflict. Guided by the theory of border institutions 
and via the research methods of hermeneutics, we found that the US, though not a claimant, appears officially 
neutral but actually pro-Japan in the conflict, though deeply involved in the dispute, purposely remains on the 
sidelines. As claimants, Japan, China and Taiwan all insist on their own claims based on supporting evidence from 
various perspectives so strongly that they leave no room for negotiations. Nevertheless, the study reveals that a 
peaceful and collaborative resolution to this complex dispute can only result from genuine dialogues for appreciating, 
reconstructing, and maintaining border institutions, possibly under the influence or leadership of the US. [China 
Media Research. 2013; 9(4): 27-44] 
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Lying in the East China Sea, an island group 
consisting of five uninhabited islands and three rocks 
(known as the Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and 
Diaoyutai in Taiwan) has been causing waves of 
sensation of the whole world. For instance, Kristof 
(2010) asked the global audience to stay tuned because 
“this is a boundary dispute that could get ugly and some 
day have far-reaching consequences for China, Japan, 
Taiwan and the United States” (p. 1). Most recently, 
Harner (2013) began his blog article in the online 
Forbes magazine with “second only to nuclear weapon 
development on North Korea and Iran, it is the most 
dangerous potential casus belli [sic] in the world today, 
and it is likely to remain so indefinitely” (p. 2). Thus, 
we can clearly sense the intensity and severity of the 
conflict under discussion.   
On the one hand, Japan declares full sovereignty 
and rejects any territorial dispute over these islands 
arguing that it discovered the islands terra nullius or 
land of no human beings and incorporated them into 
Japan as a cabinet decision in 1895 and exercised 
effective control over the islands with no Chinese 
protest until 1971. On the other, both Mainland China 
and Taiwan claim that China, not Japan, discovered and 
exercised sovereignty over the islands since the 14
th
 
century, and Japan seized them from Taiwan under 
Article Two of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 after 
Japan won the first Sino-Japanese War from1894 
to1895.   
Although disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
have been recurring for many decades, what flared up 
the most recent conflict involving Japan, China, Taiwan, 
and the US is Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s 
proposal of purchasing these islands by the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government in April 2012 and the 
subsequent nationalization of three of the islands by the 
Japanese government in September 2012. For months, 
China has been regularly sending out surveillance ships 
and planes towards the disputed areas. To confront the 
aggressive Chinese patrol missions each time, war ships 
of Japanese Coast Guards and jet fighters from the 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would come to 
intercept the approaching Chinese ships and planes. The 
non-compromise positions of the two governments have 
not only put their bilateral relationship into a stand-off 
but also filled the whole world with increasing worries 
about unexpected face-off or more catastrophic 
consequences.  
To complicate the conflict, Liang Ying-ping, 
Taiwan’s top representative to Seoul, South Korea 
announced to the media: “Our stance is clear. The 
Diaoyutai Islands are the territory of the Republic of 
China (ROC). The dispute is a three-party concern, not 
just confined to Japan and China” (Kim, 2012, p. 1). 
Just as President Ma Ying-jiou of Taiwan remarked, 
“we will not make any concessions on national 
sovereignty…. There could be more serious 
confrontations or wars if we do not resolve the dispute 
peacefully” (Mo, 2012, p. 7). President Ma called for a 
trilateral dialogue between Taiwan, Japan and China to 
resolve the sovereignty dispute. In fact, there is also a 
fourth party, the US, which has been directly and 
indirectly involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
dispute.  
From the above, we can see that there are actually 
two sides of four parties deeply involved in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute: Japan and the US as 
the accused on the defensive side; China and Taiwan as 
the accusers on the challenging side. This does not mean 
that there are no conflicts between Japan and the US and 
China and Taiwan. However, for the purpose of this 
study and based on the existing literature, we just focus 
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on exploring what is lacking in the available interactions 
between the two sides and among the four parties in this 
multi-lateral international conflict.  
 
Literature Review 
The backdrop and influence of the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands dispute. The Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands 
are located northeast of Taiwan, east of China, and 
southwest of Okinawa, the southern-most prefecture of 
Japan. In his Congressional Research Service Report, 
Manyin (2013) reported, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
consist of five islets and three rocky outcroppings with a 
total landmass of less than seven square kilometers or 
three square miles. The largest island is about two miles 
in length and less than one mile in width. None of the 
islands are inhabited and unlikely to support any human 
life or economic activities from indigenous resources. 
Despite the unfavorable natural features, Japan, China, 
and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over the islands. 
Periodic tensions and conflicts have been occurring 
among the claimants and, fueled by rising nationalism 
in all parties, waves of nation-wide campaigns have 
been witnessed, all claiming the sovereignty over theses 
islands due to their strategic significance in terms of 
economy, security, and political implications.  
Economically, sovereignty over the Senkaku/  
Diaoyu Islands could “convey exclusive economic 
rights to nearly 20,000 square nautical miles of undersea 
resources” (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008, pp. 903-904). It 
means that control of the islands would confer 
ownership of natural resources such as fishery and 
potential oil and gas reserves in their vicinity. In terms 
of security, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands lie close to key 
shipping lanes in the region. As Pan (2007) said, the 
location of the islands on the eastern edge of the 
continental margin in the East China Sea exerts strategic 
impact upon “both China and Japan’s increasingly 
voracious appetite for energy, natural resources, and 
extension into the high seas” (p. 72) and the sovereignty 
over the islands “can be a factor that significantly 
influences the location of a maritime boundary between 
China and Japan” (p. 84). This is why Suganuma (2000) 
remarked: “If there is a flash point to ignite a third Sino-
Japanese War, it will be the ownership of the Diaoyu 
Islands in the East China Sea” (p. 151). Finally, since 
both China and Japan have maritime territorial disputes 
with their neighboring countries, both have been making 
the greatest efforts avoiding any potential negative 
domino effect in the handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands dispute. Just as Koo (2009) noted, any 
concessions in the dispute “could possibly jeopardize 
their respective claims to the other disputed islands” (p. 
206). Thus, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is not 
just territorial. It bears more chain-effect significance in 
politics, economics, and national, even international 
security.  
At least, how the dispute will be resolved will 
definitely affect the Asia-Pacific region directly and 
indirectly. The Asia-Pacific region, which covers 70% 
of the earth’s surface and 50% of the world’s ocean 
surface, provides many export-oriented economies 
around the Pacific Rim with the most dynamic and 
strategic trade routes and energy resources. As a “key 
engine for the global economy” (VOC, 2013, p. 1), the 
region has half of the world’s population, with a 
combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $39 trillion, 
accounting for 56% of the world economic output. The 
region is home to quite a number of the world’s largest 
militaries and the majority of the world’s nuclear power.  
Therefore, in his remarks to the Australian 
Parliament, President Obama (2011) predicted that this 
region will “largely determine whether the century ahead 
will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless 
suffering or human progress” (p. 15). In her article 
entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” Secretary Clinton 
(2011) emphasized a smart and systematic US effort over 
the next decade by “locking in a substantially increased 
investmentdiplomatic, economic, strategic, and 
otherwisein the Asia-Pacific region” (p. 1). It is clear 
that the year 2011 became a pivot point for the United 
States to complete its withdrawal of soldiers from Iraq 
and Afghanistan and began reasserting itself in the Asia-
Pacific region. Although the reassertion of the Asia-
Pacific region is a continuation of the US policies 
undertaken by previous administrations, the Obama 
Administration intends to achieve some larger purposes 
and make the US “play a larger and long-term role in 
shaping this region and its future, by upholding core 
principles and in close partnership with our allies and 
friends” (Obama, 2011, p. 16). 
 
Scholarship on territorial conflict. Among all 
kinds of conflict, territorial conflict is next to none in its 
frequency, severity, and consequences. Holsti (1991) 
noted, among interstate wars between 1648 and1989, 
“territorial issues were by far the most important single 
issue category” (p. 307). Vasquez (1995) found, “a 
minimum of 79% of wars were fought over territory-
related issues in five historical periods from 1648 to 
1990” (p. 284). Hensel (2000) also found that, between 
1816 and 1992, more than half of the wars were related 
to issues of disputed territory, and disputes over 
territory tended to result in conflicts with much more 
fatalities than disputes of other categories. Gleditsch 
(1998) provided reasons for the territorial conflict by 
saying, “the territory itself might be seen as important to 
the identity of a people and the symbolic function might 
be more important than any material value” (p. 385). 
Similarly, Knight (1982) remarked, “territory is not; it 
becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human 
beliefs and actions that give territory meaning” (p. 517). 
Murphy (1990) also stressed, as a social construct, 
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“territory is fundamentally embedded in social 
processes,” which is “at the heart of national identity 
and cohesion and of supreme importance to the state” (p. 
531). 
To comprehend international disputes or conflicts, 
there are two main camps of scholars. While liberals 
argue that territorial disputes lose their salience as a 
result of increasing economic interdependence, realists 
counter-argue that economic interdependence not only 
fails to promote peace but also increases conflicts due to 
asymmetric dependence and inequality between 
economic partners. Nevertheless, Simmons (2005) 
found, while scholars of realist thought regard territory 
as the object of zero-sum state competition for power, 
prestige, or an imagined national identity, liberal 
scholars of globalization stress that in this increasingly 
borderless world, human capital matters more than 
territorial matters and national power. In reality, less 
than one third of the international borders have been 
disputed since World War II. Even in the Middle East, 
80% of the borders remain peaceful through mutually 
accepted formal treaties. Take China for example, it has 
settled 17 of its 23 territorial disputes since 1949. 
Moreover, China has made substantial compromises in 
most of these settlements, “usually receiving less than 
50% of the contested land” (Fravel, 2005, p. 46). In 
contrast, it is also argued, “national boundaries continue 
to have significant influences on international economic 
relations” (Simmons, 2005, p. 826). An empirical study 
of bilateral trade between the US and Canada revealed 
that “trade between Canadian provinces was 22 times 
that of Canada-US trade, all other factors being held 
equal” (McCallum, 1995, p. 617).  
As a summary, Mowle (2003) commented, realism 
and liberalism “are as much quality as they are of action. 
A comparison of the two approaches must somehow pry 
open the intent behind the action” (p. 562). It means that 
there must be a shift of the analysis from the state to the 
individuals within the state who make decisive 
decisions and implement purposive actions. Chiozza 
and Choi (2003) concurred with Mowle in their 
empirical study, “leaders, who have the political interest 
and ability to lead their countries onto a different road, 
do matter in explaining decisions to settle territorial 
disputes” (p. 275). Thus, territorial disputes may lead to 
military confrontations, but wise leadership guided by 
domestic needs and international norms may set the 
interactions between or among claimants and bilateral 
or trilateral relationships onto peaceful paths.  
 
Literauture on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
dispute. Existing literature concerning the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands dispute falls into three major categories. 
The first category of literature explains the continuity 
and escalation of the dispute. Scholars (e.g., Bush III, 
2010; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010; 
Kenny, 2004; Park, 1973; Valencia, 2000) predicted that 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute would continue and 
escalate so long historical and legal issues among the 
claimants remain unresolved and the dispute involves 
material and symbolic significance. For example, Bush 
III (2010) predicted, “there was a danger that the dispute 
might become militarized,” (p. 6) as strategists in both 
Japan and China “cited with concern the old Chinese 
expression, ‘two tigers cannot coexist on the same 
mountain’” (p. 8). However, all the flare-ups over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have been eventually calmed 
down.  
The second category of literature provides 
explanations for the mutual restraint from all parties 
involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Some 
scholars (e.g., Blanchard, 2000; Bush III, 2010; Fravel, 
2010; Ito, 2008; Hara, 2001; Lind, 2004) remarked, due 
to the US factor, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was taking place within certain 
limits. For example, Blanchard (2000) noted, “it [the US] 
currently has the authority, at a minimum, to press both 
sides to explicate their real interests and to promote 
alternatives for a settlement of the controversy” (p. 121). 
Fravel (2010) seconded, “the United States is an 
important actor in the China-Japan disputes, especially 
the conflict over the Senkaku Islands” (p. 144). Some 
other scholars (e.g., Christensen, 2006; Friedberg, 2005; 
Goldstein, 2005; Niksch, 1996; Wiegand, 2009) showed 
their worries that a more capable China might become a 
nascent China threat. Wiegand (2009) claimed, as the 
second largest consumer of oil after the US, China 
“continues to claim sovereignty over the islands and the 
dispute is nowhere close to being resolved” (p. 170). 
Nevertheless, it has been found that China has been 
cooperative and peaceful in its territorial disputes since 
1949 (Fravel, 2005, 2008, 2010; Nie, 2009).  
The final category of literature accounts for the 
repeated ups and downs in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
dispute. On the one hand, many scholars (e.g., Chung, 
2004; Fravel 2005; HagstrÖm, 2005; Pan, 2007) 
associated the ups and downs of the dispute with the 
desires and power struggles of the state elites among 
all sides of the claimants in their domestic decision-
making processes. Pan (2007) remarked that the 
handling of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute “is seen 
as a factor impacting on the legitimacy of Chinese and 
Japanese central governments in domestic politics and 
on their foreign relations in the international arena” (p. 
72). Meanwhile, many other scholars (e.g., Blanchard, 
2000; Fravel, 2010; Koo, 2009; Manyin, 2013; Tanaka, 
2010) emphasized the international nature of the 
dispute, especially the US factor. Blanchard (2000) 
noted, the US “has been deeply involved” in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and it “should 
become more actively involved in trying to encourage 
a resolution of the dispute, or at a minimum, serious 
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discussion between the Chinese and the Japanese” (p. 
121).  
It can be seen from the above that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is not simply a conflict 
between Japan/US and China/Taiwan, it is a 
complicated and multi-sided conflict of international 
nature. So far, much ink has been spilled about the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute from various 
perspectives as described, little has been done from the 
perspective of communication in terms of 
argumentation. We attempt to fill this void by exploring 
how the involved parties have been communicating to 
the public to seek answers to the following three 
research questions:  
RQ1: What are the conflicting points in the 
claimants’ claims? 
RQ2: What are the pieces of supporting evidence 
and counterevidence? 
RQ3: What is lacking for a genuinely peaceful and 
win-win solution to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute? 
The research findings of this study are expected to 
enrich the existing body of literature on conflict 
communication in general and the dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea in 
particular while shedding light on similar disputes over 
islands in the South China Sea at the same time.  
 
Theoretical Framework of Institutions 
The application of international borders as 
institutions “neither falls prey to claims that borders do 
not matter nor is prisoner to realism’s zero-sum 
assumptions” (Simmons, 2005, p. 827). Simmons is a 
Harvard scholar of international affairs, and he defined 
institutions as “sets of rules, compliance procedures, 
and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to 
constrain behavior” (p. 827). Giordano, Giordano, and 
Wolf (2005) specified that, in the international resource 
arena, “institutions range from customary practices 
among neighboring states to multilateral resource 
conventions and treaties” (p. 53). As a summary, 
Slaughter (1995) clarified, the theory of institutions 
posits that rules, norms, and decision-making 
procedures define international regimes, which reduce 
transaction costs consistent with regime principles 
through cooperation. Simultaneously, they facilitate 
connections within and between regimes over issues by 
creating conditions for orderly, multilateral negotiations.   
Amenta and Ramsey (2010) noted further that there 
are three types of theoretical claims in institutions: 
sociological, historical, and political. The first holds that 
cultural and ideational causes in a society exert 
influence on the state policies. Focusing on macro-
political or macro-economic determinants, the second 
asks big questions and highlights the importance of 
institutions. The third argues that the process of 
formation of states, political systems, and political party 
systems have strong impact upon political processes and 
outcomes. Nie (2009) specified two major forms of 
institutional explanations over territorial disputes. The 
first argues that “border territories are extraordinary 
spaces embodying a defined legal order within 
international relations,” therefore; “border issues 
influence the attitudes of policymakers” (p. 491). Jean-
Marc Blanchard
 
and Paul K. Huth
 
are representative 
scholars here, and they predict democratic countries 
tend towards peaceful means, and non-democratic states 
towards non-peaceful means of resolving territorial 
issues. The second emphasizes: “International 
institutions are an important guarantee of conflict 
prevention” (Nie, 2009, p. 492). Stephen A. Kocs
 
and 
Mark W. Zacher are representatives in this regard. To 
them, without clear and legally demarcated boundaries, 
wars will probably break out between involved states.  
Furthermore, Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf (2005) 
summarized three causes for potential territorial 
conflicts and four conditions for successful institutions. 
The most likely locations for territorial conflicts are 
“those in which (1) institutional development is 
hindered; (2) previously functioning institutions 
collapse; or (3) change in resource conditions outpace 
the ability for institutional adaptation” (p. 48). Critical 
factors for long-term institutional success include: (1) 
clear language concerning resource allocation and 
quality control; (2) high degree of institutional 
adaptability; (3) allocating benefits considered more 
productive than allocating the resource; and (4) clearly 
defined conflict resolution mechanism in place.  
 
Research Method 
For the purpose of this study, we collected our 
primary data from relevant wartime declarations
1
, 
bilateral treaties
2
, government statements
3
, and dozens 
of news briefs from the governments of the above three 
governments plus the government of the US. The 
supporting evidence and counterevidence of the 
claimants’ claims are composed of historical records of 
Chinese missions and official decrees during the Ming 
and Qing dynasties and Japanese survey and Cabinet 
decision to annex the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; letters 
between the Chinese and Japanese and among the 
Japanese, relevant maps of Japan, China, and the US, 
and experts’ interview transcripts with Professor 
Susumu Yabuki and Kurt Campbell, former assistant 
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. 
Besides, we made a purposive selection of artifacts in 
terms of the relevant media reports and readers’ online 
responses concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
dispute, from both the LexisNexis news database and 
Google News website. In total, we have printed over 
100 pages of singled-lined news reports. For the 
discussion about the role of the US in the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands dispute, we focused on the online Forbes 
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Magazine blog article entitled “The U.S. Could Have 
Prevented the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis. Why Did It Not?” 
in February 2011 by Stephen Harner, who has worked 
in both Japan and China for dozens of years, and the 60-
some responses to his blog.  
For data analysis, we adopted hermeneutics to 
interpret the interactions in the above-mentioned 
communication artifacts of Japan, China, Taiwan and 
the US. Byrne (2001) explained, hermeneutics is usually 
used for the interpretation and understanding of texts 
derived from stories, interviews, participant 
observations, letters, speeches, or other relevant written 
documents and personal experiences. Girish (2008) 
further clarified, as an art of interpreting, hermeneutics 
developed into a theory of human understanding 
through the works of Scheleiermacher, Dilthey, 
Heideggar, Gadamar, and Derrida. The essence 
of hermeneutics is that “the concealed import of a text 
cannot be understood without uncovering the historical 
contact and the sociocultural milieu of the community 
on which it is based” (p. 2). This means that, to 
thoroughly and appropriately analyze a text, it is 
essential to understand the origin of the text along with 
its historical and cultural background. To this end, the 
texts are usually closely examined in connection to their 
relevant historical and socio-cultural contexts for the 
generation of themes or patterns as research findings, 
which reflect the knowledge of the phenomenon under 
study.  
 
Research Findings and Critical Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, there are two sides and four 
parties in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, namely 
Japan and the US on one side and China and Taiwan on 
the other. Among the four parties, Japan, China, and 
Taiwan are claimants of the sovereignty over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands while the US is a deeply-
involved participant and important factor in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. In addition to the 
literature review, our analysis of the selected raw data 
results in the following three interrelated aspects as the 
conflicting points in the claimant’s claims: (1) the 
ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; (2) the 
change of hands of these islands; and (3) the US role in 
the dispute. Below are the provided supporting evidence 
and counterevidence of Japan, China, and Taiwan 
regarding the above conflicting points, our critical 
analysis of the conflicting points and evidence, and our 
conclusion of the US role in the dispute.  
 
Evidence and counterevidence regarding the 
ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands under administrative control, 
Japan rejects the existence of any dispute over the 
sovereignty of these islands. According to its official 
statements of “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over 
the Senkaku Islands (The Basic View)” and “Q&A on 
the Senkaku Islands” (Q&A) by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) of Japan, the Japanese government 
began a series of thorough surveys of the Senkaku 
Islands from 1885, which proved the islands 
uninhabited. Then, a Cabinet Decision (Appendix 1) 
was made on Jan. 14, 1895, and the islands were 
incorporated into Japan as terra nullius with markers 
erected (Fact Sheet of MOFA, 2012, para. 9).  
Even during the US administration of the islands, the 
US Navy “established firing ranges on the islets and paid 
an annual rent of $11,000 to Zenji Koga, the son of the 
first Japanese settlers of the islets” (Manyin, 2013, p. 4). 
A copy of the lease contract is provided in Appendix 2. 
Besides, the Japanese government also lists the following 
as examples of valid control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands: (1) Patrol and law enforcement; (2) Levying 
taxes on the owners of the islands; (3) Management as 
state-owned land; (4) Implementing researches for 
utilization and development (Q&A, p. 4).  
However, the Chinese side counter-argued that 
when the Japanese Cabinet decided to annex the islands 
to the territory of Japan in 1985, Japan was fully aware 
that “the islands have already been well-known to Qing 
envoy ships dispatched to crown the former Zhongshan 
King and already given fixed Chinese names and used 
as navigation aids en route to the Ryukyu Islands” 
(MOFA of Japan, 1950). The citation is from a report of 
the Magistrate of Okinawa, Nishimura Sutezo to the 
Japanese Home Secretary Yamagata Aritomo on 
September 22, 1885. In less than a month on October 21, 
1885, the Japanese Foreign Minister announced: “Most 
recently Chinese newspapers have been reporting 
rumors of our government’s intention of occupying 
certain islands owned by China located next to Taiwan,” 
and he warned, “the investigations of the above-
mentioned islands should not be published in the 
Official Gazette or newspaper. Please pay attention to 
this” (MOFA of Japan, 1950).  
In its “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of P.R. China” (Statement) on Sept. 10, 2012 and 
“Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China” White 
Paper (White Paper) on Sept. 28, 2012 by the State 
Council Information Office of P.R. China, the Chinese 
government held that it was China, instead of Japan, 
that discovered and peacefully used the Diaoyu Islands 
since its Ming Dynasty in the 14
th
 century. According to 
the White Paper, 24 mission voyages were made from 
China to the Ryukyu Kingdom, a tributary nation of 
China, from 1732 to 1866. There were ample records 
from these voyages about the Diaoyu Islands. Envoy 
Chen Kan from the Ming Court recorded in the Envoys 
to Ryukyu in 1534, “the ship has passed Diaoyu Dao, 
Huangmao Yu, Chi Yu…. Then, Gumi Mountain comes 
into sight, which is where the land of Ryukyu begins” 
(White Paper, 2012, p. 3). For another example, to 
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guard against Japanese pirates along the southeast coast, 
Zheng Ruozeng compiled the Illustrated Compendium 
on Maritime Security (Zhouhai Tubian) in 1556 under 
the auspices of Hu Songxian, who is the supreme 
commander of the southeast coastal defense of the Ming 
Court. The Diaoyu Islands were included in the 
Compendium (Appendix 3).  
Geographically, China posits that the Diaoyu 
Islands sit on the edge of the Asian continental shelf and 
are separated from the Ryukyu Islands by a deep 
underwater trench called the Okinawa Trough 
(Appendix 4). China holds that the distance between 
Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands is 120 nautical miles, 
which is shorter than the 200 nautical miles between the 
Diaoyu Islands and Okinawa of Japan. Moreover, the 
surrounding waters of the Diaoyu Islands have been 
traditionally Chinese fishing grounds (White Paper, 
2012, pp. 3-5). In one of the envoy missions, Envoy Xu 
Baoguang also recorded in his Records of Messages 
from Chong-Shan in 1719: “After sailing 10 geng4, our 
ships passed Diaoyu Islands…. After sailing another 6 
geng, our ships will arrive at Kume Hill, which is the 
southwest boundary between the Ryukyu Kingdom and 
China” (Inoue, para. 8). Envoy Xu Baoguang also 
described “the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are the same 
color as other Chinese territories on Fuzu” (Appendix 5) 
(Inoue, para. 9).  
By the same token, in its official statement of “The 
Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of 
Republic of China” (Diaoyutai Islands) by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China, Taiwan claims, 
“The Diaoyutai Islands, an island group of Taiwan, are 
under the jurisdiction of Yilan County” (Diaoyutai 
Islands, para. 1). Historically, it is the Chinese that 
discovered and named the Diaoyutai Islands and put it 
under the jurisdiction of Yilan County of Taiwan. 
Chinese fishermen frequently sought shelter on the 
islands and knew that there were no terra nullius between 
China and the Ryukyu Kingdom (The Diaoyutai Islands, 
para. 6). Geographically and geologically, the Diaoyutai 
Islands share the same monsoon zone with Taiwan, thus 
making it favorable for sail from Taiwan to the islands 
than from the Ryukyu Islands. Geologically, the 
Okinawa Trough separates the Diaoyutai Islands and the 
Ryukyu Islands, making them reside on different 
tectonic plates in the East China Sea (The Diaoyutai 
Islands, para. 2-5). Thus, to the Chinese in China and 
Taiwan, these historical records demonstrate that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Chiwei Island belong to 
China and Kume Island belongs to Ryukyu. The 
dividing line between China and Ryukyu is Hei Shui 
Gou, which is today’s Okinawa Trough between Chiwei 
Island and Kume Island. However, it is “an established 
principle in international law that neither discovery nor 
use by itself is sufficient to establish sovereignty over 
land territory” (Su, 2005, p. 49).  
Evidence and counterevidence regarding the 
change of hands of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The 
Japanese government held that the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands were not part of “the Island of Formosa together 
with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said 
Island of Formosa,” (Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895, (b) of 
Article 2), which were ceded to Japan in May 1985 at the 
end of the First Sino-Japanese War (Fact Sheet of MOFA, 
2012, para. 11). Whether the Senkaku Islands were 
included in the islands of the above treaty article, “there 
was no mutual recognition between the two countries” 
(About the Senkaku Islands of MOFA, 2013, p. 11).  
Furthermore, Under the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty of 1951, Japan renounced Taiwan but maintained 
territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
(The Basic View, 2013, para. 2). The San Francisco 
Peace Treaty stipulates the US “as the sole 
administering authority” over “Nansei Shoto south of 29 
degree north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and 
the Daito Islands)” (1951, Article 3). The Ryukyu 
Islands and the Daito Islands were reverted to Japan 
with “all and any powers of administration, legislation, 
and jurisdiction” under Article 2 of the Agreement 
between Japan and the United States of America 
Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands of 
1971 (also known as the Okinawa Reversion 
Agreement). The Senkaku Islands were included in this 
agreement as can seen in Appendix 6. 
The Japanese government also pointed out that 
neither China nor Taiwan made any objections to the 
stipulations in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 
and the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1971 (About 
the Senkaku Islands of MOFA, 2013, p. 7). Instead, 
both China and Taiwan actually recognized the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory. For 
example, it was mentioned in a letter of appreciation 
from a Chinese consul in Nagasaki in 1919 that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were within the “Yaeyama 
District, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan”  
(Appendix 7). For another example, an article in the 
People’s Daily dated January 8, 1953 reported that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are one of the seven island 
groups belonging to the Ryukyu Islands (Appendix 8). 
Finally, the Republic of China New Atlas published in 
1933 (Appendix 9) and World Atlas published in 1958 
(Appendix 10) identified the Senkaku Islands as part of 
Japan (Fact Sheet of MOFA, 2012, para. 13).  
In response, the Chinese government argued that 
the Diaoyu Islands were grabbed from China by Japan 
in the first Sino-Japanese War from 1894-1895 (White 
Paper, 2012, pp. 5-8). Early in 1884, a Japanese 
businessman by the name of Tatsushiro Koga applied to 
lease the Diaoyu Islands, but both the Okinawa 
Prefecture Government and the Home Ministry in 
Tokyo turned down his applications because “it was not 
clear at that time whether the islands belonged to the 
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Japanese empire” (White Paper, 2012, p. 5). 
Nevertheless, in response to a report of the Magistrate 
of Okinawa, the Japanese National Home Secretary 
wrote on Sept. 22, 1885: “In regard to the matter of 
placing national markers and developing the islands, it 
should await a more appropriate time” (MOFA of Japan, 
1950). The appropriate time came when China was 
defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War and had to sign 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1985. In the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, China was made to “cede to 
Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty… the island of 
Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or 
belonging to the said island of Formosa” (Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, 1895, (b) of Article 2).  
Legally, China argues that the Diaoyu Islands 
were returned to China after World War II. However, 
it is the US that had made backroom deals with Japan 
by arbitrarily including the Diaoyu Islands under the 
US trusteeship in the 1950s and returned the power of 
administration over the islands to Japan in the 1970s 
(White Paper, 2012, pp. 7-9). On Sept. 2, 1045, Japan 
solemnly “undertakes for the Emperor, the Japanese 
Government and their successors to carry out the 
provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith” 
(First Instrument of Surrender, 1945, para. 6), which 
stipulates that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited 
to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku 
and such minor islands as we determine” (Potsdam 
Declaration, 1945, (8), (b), Annex II). Nonetheless, 
when Taiwan and its appertaining islands were 
returned to the Republic of China in 1945, Japan did 
not give back the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands, whose 
name had been changed to Senkaku Islands since 1900. 
Thus, the Chinese were left “unaware that the 
uninhabited ‘Senkaku Islands’ were in fact the former 
Diaoyu Islands (Shaw, 2012, para. 15). To make 
matters more complicated, the US extended the 
Ryukyu to include the Diaoyu Islands during its 
administration from 1953 to 1971 and returned 
Ryukyu Islands including the Diaoyu Islands to Japan 
under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971, which 
was signed without the presence and agreement of 
China (White Paper, 2012, pp. 2, 5 & 7). All this not 
only supports the Chinese arguments but also explains 
the belated protests from the Chinese people in China 
and Taiwan over Japan’s theft of Chinese territory, 
Chinese maps incorrectly identifying the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory, and the US 
manipulation of its hegemonic power. 
From the perspective of the government of Taiwan, 
Japan annexed the Daioyutai Islands as a direct 
consequence of the first Sino-Japanese War and never 
made any public announcement in order to avoid 
arousing China’s objection. The islands should have 
been returned to Taiwan after World War II (The 
Diaoyutai Islands, para. 16-17), but the US gave the 
Diaoyutai and Ryukyu Islands to Japan against the 
strong will of the Chinese. According to declassified 
documents of the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS), the embassy of Republic of China (ROC) sent 
a note to the US State Department on March 15, 1971, 
making clear that “the U.S. is requested to respect the 
ROC’s sovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets and 
restore them to the ROC” (FRUS, Vol. XVII, China, 
1969-1976, Document 115, para. 7). Although 
Kissinger’s hand-written comment “but that is nonsense 
since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more 
neutral position?” (FRUS, Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1976, 
Document 115, footnote 3) on the US position of the 
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, the US finally did 
implement such a nonsensical policy till this very day. 
 
The US role in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
dispute. Although the US is not a claimant, it is still 
necessary to demonstrate the US position in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute due to its alliance with 
Japan and its deep involvement. The US began 
administrating the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 1953 
and returned them to Japanese administration in 1971. 
According to Fravel (2010), since World War II, the US 
“has been a direct participant in the dispute over the 
Senkaku Islands” (p. 147). The US policy towards the 
Senkaku territorial dispute is based on: “(1) neutrality in 
terms of the ultimate sovereignty of contested areas and 
(2) peaceful resolution without resort to coercion or 
armed force” (p. 147). In other words, “the United States 
took a neutral position with regard to the competing 
claims of Japan, China, and Taiwan, despite the return of 
the islets to Japanese administration” (Manyin, 2013, p. 
4). Upon stepping down as the Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton reiterated the US neutral position over the 
sovereignty of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. She further 
stated: “We oppose any unilateral actions that would seek 
to undermine Japanese administration and we urge all 
parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage 
disagreements through peaceful means” (Quinn, 2013, 
para. 5-6). Furthermore, the US Senate unanimously 
approved an amendment to the 2013 National Defense 
Authorization Act, announcing: “While the United States 
takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the 
Senkaku Islands, the United States acknowledges the 
administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands” 
(Johnston, 2012, para. 2). Clearly, the US stance in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is officially neutral but 
actually pro-Japan.  
Just as Blanchard (2000) noted, “the historical 
record clearly shows that the United States favored in 
both word and deed Japanese claims to the islands” (p. 
97). On January 19, 1946, the commander of the 
Okinawa Naval Base was instructed to “extend Military 
Government operations so as to include the Northern 
Ryukyus south of the 30
th
 parallel north and to include 
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Sakishima Gunto, [which includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands included]” (p. 103). On August 6, 1948, a report 
from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
emphasized, “if the Communists won control of China, 
the return of the Ryukyus to China would give the 
Soviet Union access to these islands and thereby 
endanger the entire US Pacific base system as well as 
Japan” (p. 105). In January 1951, the Prime Minister of 
Japan sent a message to the US State Department, 
agreeing to “give the US all required military rights 
there” for “transferring title to the Ryukyus and Bonins” 
(p. 107). As a result, former US Secretary of State 
Dulles claimed that Japan had “residual sovereignty” in 
the Ryukyu Islands, which means: “The United States 
will not transfer its sovereign powers [administrative, 
legislative, and jurisdiction] over the Ryukyu Islands to 
any nation other than Japan” (p. 109). Therefore, it is 
questionable for the US, which has been so deeply 
involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, to 
“insist on remaining on the sidelines” (p. 120).  
This is why China responded by saying, “the United 
States and Japan conducted backroom deals concerning 
the ‘power of administration’ over the Diaoyu Dao” 
(White Paper. China, 2012, p. 8). Harner (2011) seconded 
in his blog article, “it was the US acquiescence in (if not 
encouragement of) the Noda government’s decision to 
nationalize the disputed islands … that enabled this 
crisis” (para. 5). There is also supporting voice in the 
media, “indeed, the ambiguity of maintaining US 
neutrality on sovereignty yet giving Japan administrative 
power over the islands, backed by a mutual defense treaty, 
has emboldened Tokyo to nationalize the islands” 
(Cheong, 2012, para. 2).  
 
Discussion 
As mentioned before, territorial conflict is next to 
none in its frequency, severity, and consequences 
among all kinds of conflict. To guard against potential 
territorial conflict and strive for mutually beneficial 
resolutions, the theory of border institutions has been 
proposed, which refers to “sets of rules, compliance 
procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms 
designed to constrain behavior” (Simmons, 2005, p. 
827). In the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, 
unwritten rules, compliance procedures, and ethical 
norms did exist since China’s Ming Dynasty in the 14th 
century till 1885. Thus, the Chinese envoys could use 
the islands as navigation aids during many mission 
voyages to the Ryukyu Kingdom, and the ocean areas 
around the islands could remain peaceful for so long. 
There were also common understandings and restrained 
behaviors on all sides of Japan, China, and Taiwan even 
after Japan secretly annexed the islands to its territory in 
1885 and changed the name of the islands from Diaoyu to 
Senkaku. For instance, the Japanese government has done 
a good job for many years to keep not only foreigners but 
also its own nationals from approaching and developing 
the islands. It is when such status quo was violated that 
waves of dispute and conflict arose consequently.   
In our theoretical framework, both positive and 
negative prospective scenarios have also been depicted 
with or without border institutions. As Giordano, 
Giordano, and Wolf (2005) noted, the most likely 
locations for territorial conflicts are “those in which (1) 
institutional development is hindered; (2) previously 
functioning institutions collapse; or (3) change in 
resource conditions outpace the ability for institutional 
adaptation” (p. 48). With regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands dispute, all these three conditions were met. 
Change in resource conditions resulted in the hindrance 
to and collapse of existing institutions. For example, the 
Japanese government declared that it was in the 1970s 
that China and Taiwan began arguing for the 
sovereignty over the islands only after the United 
Nations’ report of potential oil and gas reserves of 
200,000 square kilometers in the East China Sea in 1968 
(About the Senkaku Islands, 2013, p. 7). Taiwan was 
even caught to have changed the terminology of the 
“Senkaku Group of Islands” to “Diaoyutai Islets” in its 
middle school geography textbook (Appendix 11).  
The Japanese government also insisted that there 
was no agreement to shelve the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
issue when Japan and China normalized their diplomatic 
relations in 1972 and when they were negotiating for the 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. Former 
Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara officially confirmed 
that at the Japan-China summit meeting on Sept. 27, 
1972, “they [the Chinese] did not mention the words 
‘shelving the issue,’ therefore; it cannot be judged that 
there existed any agreement of ‘shelving the issue’ from 
the meeting.” Maehara continued that, at the Japan-
China summit meeting on Oct. 25, 1978, “‘shelving the 
issue’ was the remark made by Mr. Deng Xiaoping 
unilaterally” (About the Senkaku, 2013, pp. 9-10). 
However, the Chinese government remarked that the 
Japanese Government, besides changing the name of 
Diaoyu to Senkaku to mislead the Chinese people, is also 
attempting to “write off with one stroke the consensus 
between the two nations” (Statement, 2012, para. 6). 
According to the Statement of China, the leaders of the 
two countries, during their summit meetings in 1972 and 
1978 “reached important understanding and common 
ground on ‘leaving the issue of the Diaoyu Island to be 
resolved later’” (para, 6). This consensus “opened the 
door to normalization of China-Japan relations and was 
followed by tremendous progress in China-Japan 
relations and stability and tranquility in East Asia in the 
following 40 years” (para. 6).  
It is even recorded in “About the Senkaku Islands” 
by MOFA of Japan, “Vice Premier Deng: ‘We refer to 
the Senkaku Islands as the Diaoyu…. At this time of 
negotiations on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, we 
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agreed to leave the issue aside in much the same way’” 
(p. 9). Deng’s remark of  “we agreed to leave the issue 
aside” is written in black and white, but MOFA of Japan 
still denies there is no agreement to shelve the Senkaku 
issue. Professor Susumu of Yokohama City University 
further clarified, the exchange of Japanese apology in 
all sincerity and shelving of the Senkaku issue between 
former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue and Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai were “removed in the MOFA-
prepared transcripts,” which became “the source of 
mistrust between China and Japan” (Harner, 2012, pp. 
1-2).   
When we reread Giordano, Giordano, and Wolfa’s 
(2005) four critical factors for long-term institutional 
success, which include: (1) clear language concerning 
resource allocation and quality control; (2) high degree of 
institutional adaptability; (3) allocating benefits 
considered more productive than allocating the resource; 
and (4) clearly defined conflict resolution mechanism in 
place (pp. 58-59), we cannot but emphasize President Ma 
Yingjeou’s peace initiative over the Senkaku/Diaoyu, 
which proposed that “all parties concerned hold 
conflicting standpoints, and that this is the cause of the 
long-standing disputes and the recent rise of tensions in 
the region” (East China Sea Peace Initiative by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 
para. 4). In line with the critical factors for and as the first 
step towards long-term institutional success, Taiwan calls 
on all the involved parties to “resolve disputes peacefully 
based on the UN Charter and relevant provisions in 
international law” (para. 5).  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to explore the 
interactions between the two sides and among the four 
parties over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with 
the intention to find out what is lacking in their 
communication for a genuinely peaceful and mutually 
beneficial solution to the multilateral international 
conflict. To this end, we raised three research questions 
and searched for the answers under the theoretical 
guidance of border institutions and the research methods 
of hermeneutics.  
We found that, as the answer to RQ1, the three 
conflicting points in the claimants’ claims are: (1) the 
ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; (2) the 
change of hands of these islands; and (3) the US role in 
the dispute. As the answer to the RQ2, we found that in 
terms of the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
Japan provided evidence that the islands were terra 
nullius after repeated survey when it annexed them with 
a Cabinet Decision in 1895. In response, both China and 
Taiwan supplied geographical and geological evidence, 
historical envoy mission records, maritime defense 
system, and letters between high-ranking officials of 
Japan as well as international conference declarations 
and the instrument of Japanese surrender. It is really 
hard to provide a universally accepted warrant as to 
which side the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands belongs. Each 
side has vulnerable points in its claims. It appears that 
Japan is legally stronger in its evidence, but such legal 
evidence has been overshadowed by its secretive 
annexation of the islands without public notice and 
backroom deals with the US. Both China and Taiwan 
have provided rich historical, geographical, and ethical 
evidence; however, more legal evidence may be 
required for international law court resolution.  
As the answer to RQ3, we found that what is 
lacking in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is threefold: First, 
among the claimants, each claimant may need to study 
its own claims in relation to the mingled history and the 
positive future prospects. To avoid the worst in history 
from repeating itself and maintain stability and 
prosperity in bi-lateral or tri-lateral relations, Japan, 
China, and Taiwan ought to seek consensus again by 
calming down and sitting down for open dialogues and 
better understanding.  
Second, since it has been so deeply involved in the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and anxious to “play a 
larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its 
future” (Obama, 2011, para. 16), the US should play a 
more active, more responsible, and more impartial role. 
In other words, the US is expected to take the lead to 
establishing and maintaining international rules and 
norms, not just US core principles, and nurture 
mutually-beneficial partners with all claimants instead 
of just its allies. Just as Campbell, a renowned US 
diplomat for Asian affairs, stressed in an interview: “So 
we’re going to push hard for more diplomacy, more 
dialogue, and more caution, in both Beijing and Tokyo” 
(Kato, 2013, p. 6).  
Last but not least, all the three claimants are 
advised to seek commonalities by putting aside 
differences and begin working out constructive border 
institutions. As mentioned before, border institutions 
can maintain peace between neighboring countries; 
whereas, catastrophic consequences may occur as a 
result of increasing conflicts when the existing 
institutions collapsed. In other words, territorial disputes 
may lead to military confrontations, but wise leadership 
guided by domestic needs and international norms may 
set the interactions between or among claimants and 
bilateral or trilateral relationships onto peaceful paths. 
Hopefully, by recognizing and appreciating the existing 
border institutions in the form of customary practices 
since the 14
th
 century, all the three claimants, possibly 
under the influence or leadership of the US, start 
working together towards acceptable and legal resource 
conventions and treaties in the East China Sea today and 
South China Sea tomorrow.  
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Notes. 
1. The Cairo Declaration on Dec. 1, 1943, The Yalta 
Agreement on March 24, 1945, The Potsdam 
Proclamation on Aug. 2, 1945, and Japan Instrument of 
Surrender of Sept. 2, 1945 
2. Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, San 
Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan on Sept. 8, 1951, and 
the Okinawa Reversion Treaty on June 17, 1971 
3. “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the 
Senkaku Islands” in February, 2013 and “About the 
Senkaku Islands” in February 2013 of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of P.R. China” on Sept. 10, 2012 and 
“The Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China” of 
Sept. 28, 2012 of China, “The Diaoyutai Islands: An 
Inherent Part of the Territory” of the Republic of China 
and the official announcement of “Our Clear Stance” on 
Dec. 30, 2012 of Taiwan 
4.  One geng equals 18.6 miles. 
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